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On February 25th, 1967j by Decree-Law N° 200, President Castello Branco 
approved a bill for administrative reform drawn up by a group of advisers 
from the Office of the Minister Extraordinary for Planning and Economic 
Co-ordination. This bill represents the fourth attempt at an all-encompassing 
and global reform since the last administration of President Getulio Vargas. 
Thus, the history of federal administrative reform in Brazil - whether 
undertaken in a parliamentary or presidential system; a bipartisan or 
multipartisan system; a constitutional or extra-constitutional re'gimej 
or whether under, the responsibility of a special commission (such as the 
Commission for Administrative Studies and Projects - CEPA) or a Minister 
Extraordinary - already offers enough perspective and wealth of circumstances 
, to warrant a more detailed analysis in terms of administrative theory. 
On the other hand, although long and rich, the experience has been frustrating, 
since none of the previous attempts at reform has succeeded in reducing 
the gap between the operational capacity of the bureaucracy and the growing 
administrative demands of social aid economic development. Therefore, 
it becomes all the more pertinent to provide an analysis which not only 
identifies the basic elements of past flaws, but provides a diagnosis of 
these problems leading to the formulation of more successful future strategies 
for implementing both present and future reform projects. 
Historical synthesis of the reform experience 
Strictly speaking, the movement for the federal administrative reform 
in Brazil began in the thirties, under the revolutionary government of 
Getulio Vargas. In fact, it could be said that it was the 1930 Revolution 
which established the basis of the Administrative State ̂  in Brazil. 
1/ The expression refers here to such characteristics as the growth of 
the civil service and the nature of the public function- in modern 
govemmoit, as discussed by Fritz Morstein Marx, The Administrative 
State (2nd. edition* Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1961), 
especially Chapter I. Also Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State A 
Study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration 




The first corrective steps were concentrated in the area of matériel 
administration, with the creation of a Permanent Commission on Standards, in 
1930, and of a Central Purchasing Commission, in 1931» In 1934, the 
Federal Constitution provided for the merit system (articles 16S and 170, 
paragraph 2), and two years later, in 1936, the first general law for the 
civil service in Brazil - Law N° 284, of October 28 - established basic 
rules for personnel administration and a system of position classification« 
It also created a central personnel agency, the Federal Civil Service 
Council. The Federal Constitution of 1937 provided for the establishment 
of an administrative department for the civil service - known today as DASP -
organized in 1938, which was to play a major role in all future reform 
efforts» The year 1939 saw the introduction of the first Federal Civil 
Servants Statute of the Union* In 1940, also by a decree-law, the budgeting 
and accounting procedures of the states and municipalities were standardized* 
A new civil servant's statute was approved in 1952 and in that same year , 
a long and regrettable struggle was begun for the adoption of a job 
classification plan based on the.duties and responsibilities of the 
various positions of the civil service» In 1954, the first Bill designed 
to reform the general structure and methods of the federal administration 
was introduced to Congress. A new attempt, this time under 
President Juscelino Kubitscheck, did not obtain approval. 
President Joâo Goulart appointed Amaral Peixoto as a special Minister 
for administrative reform, but still no reform came about. The 
Government of Castello Branco also concerned itself with this problem 
and enacted accordingly Decree-law N° 200, which controls "the organization 
of the Federal Administration, establishes policies for the Administrative 
Reform and other measures" Jr^ 
Throughout* these thirty years of reformative efforts, there is no 
denying the gap that has existed between proposed objectives and the 
actual attainment of goals, whatever the area under consideration. In 
personnel administration, for example, the merit system, although 
prescribed in the Constitution since 1934» does not account, as yet, for 
2/ Diârio Of ici al. Estados Unidos do Brasil, ¿7-2-1967, Suplemento ao 
N° 39, Seçao I, Parte I, p. 4 . 
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10 per cent of the federal civil servants, according to unquestioned 
statistics furnished by the DASP. Had the constitutional provision been 
complied with, and taking into account retirements, deaths, resignations, 
dismissals "and other forms of vacancy, at least 90 per cent of all present 
civil servants would have entered the civil service under some form of 
open competitive examination. This gap between the calculated merit figure 
of 90 per cent and that of the actual 10 per cent obtained is an indication 
of the high degree of formalism ̂  of the personnel system of Brazilian 
federal administrât ion. The gap between the intention and actual fulfilment 
of goals is also a common factor in other reforms of the housekeeping 
activities. In fact, vho would deny thé systematic decline in the field 
of matériel after the auspicious beginnings of the Permanent Commission on 
Standards and of the Central Purchasing Commission? The operational 
jurisdiction of the Federal Purchasing Department is becoming ever smaller. 
What has been done, of any significance, in the field of patrimonial 
administration? The Public Buildings Division is only one amongst innumerable 
ghost-agencies in the public service. Finally, the budgetary system has 
been practically of no use at all as an instrument of government planning, 
since the budget is characterized by a lack of veracity (hence its almost 
uselessness as an instrument of programatic control). In short, when 
making a general assessment, the wide gap between what was intended and 
what actually has been done becomes evident. 
: One should not conclude, however, that DASP was a failure. Far from 
it, the Daspian contribution to the Brazilian public service has been, in 
point of fact, invaluable. To ignore it would be not only ingratitude but 
intellectual blindness. The flaws with which DASP is charged spring from 
various causes, the most serious of which is the neglect and even antagonism 
of which the agency has been victim since 1945» except during the period 
of the last Vargas government. Thus, the point of view here submitted is 
not that of DASP's failure, but rather that the Daspian reformative action 
would have produced more profound and lasting effects and engendered other 




forces capable of carrying on the innovation task if the strategy of 
change on which the reforms were based had been adequate to the needs and 
possibilities of the Brazilian federal bureaucracy« 
Though it might seem so at first glance, this is not a purely academic 
point of view. The fact that it cannot be tested scientifically - since 
the past cannot be brought back so that a different strategy from the one 
used could be tried - does not diminish its crucial importance under the 
present political situation in Brazil» This is so because, in a, way, this 
country is witnessing - and no one can ascertain whether it is for the 
last time - political conditions very similar to those prevailing in Vargas1 
time, in which the public administrator disposed of exceptional powers to 
implement changes, regardless of the acceptability of such changes. Thus, 
it is not only valid but indispensable to ask: will the strategy today be 
the same as that of yesterday? If so, we should inquire further: will 
today's reforms bring in themselves, as did those of yesterday, the germs 
of counter-reform? Will identical strategies forge identical destinies? 
Will revenges repeat themselves as in 1945, cancelling out the positive 
aspects as well as the shortcomings of the reforms? What can be done in 
terms of strategy, in order to guaranteee, for tomorrow, the continuity of 
some of the achievements obtained after so much struggle today? 
k new analytical approach to the reform: 
change strategy 
Analysis of the experience of administrative federal reform in Brazil 
from the standpoint of the strategy of change on which the reform was based 
is justified on various ground?. In the first place, such an approach has 
not yet been explored. Criticism and analysis of the reforms, when worthy 
of appraisal, have concentrated on the what« the content, purposiveness 
of the reforms, and not on the strategy of its launching and implementation» 
Second, many barriers to reforms, though they may often exist before the 
reforms themselves are often functions Of the very strategy adopted. In 
point of fact, it is theoretically plausible and can be empirically 
demonstrated that the detrimental potential of such obstacles varies with 




to weaken, the paralyzing effects of the obstacles. Finally, to focus 
our analysis on strategy is justifiable because, after so many years of 
reformative experience, the teleological aspects of the reform, the 
diagnosis of the shortcomings and of needs, and the elaboration of 
solutions, are well known to the senior technicians of the public service. 
Who would react against the streamlining of the Presidency of the Republic? 
Who would ignore the necessity of decentralizing administrative machinery? 
Who would deny the need to institutionalize planning activities at the 
ministerial level? Who would refute the best tendencies designed to make 
the budget an instrument of economic and financial planning? Who would 
dispute the vitalness of programatic control of budget execution, rather 
than a mere legal or formal control? Therefore, whereas the need for such 
reforms has become increasingly less controversial, the problem of how to 
unleash the reform - a strategic problem - becomes ever more crucial. In 
point of fact, it is well possible that the whole drama of under-development 
is not so much the lack of knowledge of adequate solutions, but, rather, 
one of how to conceive and put into motion strategies that might convert 
some of those solutions into reality. 
It should be pointed out that though, in the great majority of cases, 
the reforms were defeated »hen still in the legislative stage (where barriers 
were almost unsurmountable)J^ those approved by the Legislature> or. 
made without its participation, have also failed. In other words, past 
strategy of administrative implementation, which is the object of this 
article, has not been able to overcome the barriers to execution of reform 
measures. The fundamental questions put forth here ares why did the 
attempted implementation of any of the reforms, even those, approved by 
Congress (or regardless of legislative approval, as daring the dictatorial 
periods), not correspond to their intended objectives? What is the 
y For an excellent analysis of the vicissitudes of administrative reforms 
in the legislative stage see "A reforma administrativa Brasileira 
(Comissao de Estudos e Pro jetos Administrativos) Vol. IV. Relatório 
Final (Rio de Janeiro: Departamento de Jmprensa Nacional, 1963), 
Ch. I-III. The vicissitudes of the present plan of position 
classification are brought to light in Classificasao de Cargos no Brasil, 
by Kleber Nascimento_( Instituto Brasileiro de Ciencias Administrativas: 




significance, from the standpoint of the strategy of change, of the gradual 
backslide which has extinguished, since the redemocratization of the country 
in 1945, so many of the positive gains of the reforms? What strategy variants 
could be applied to minimize the counter-reform? 
Basic components of a strategic model 
Any model change strategy can be analytically reduced into three basic 
components: a normative or ideological component, a substantive component 
and an operational or behavioural component. The first refers to assumptions, 
beliefs, preferences, attitudes and values that underlie what could be called 
the philosophy or ideology of change-agents of reform. The statement "So 
and so is in the Posdcorbian era", for example, characterized - though in 
a somewhat faulty, when not in a hasty and malicious way - the administrative 
ideology of the person in question. In other words, what is meant is that 
such a person attaches to the formal organization an excessive conditioning 
power, which it does not really possess. Another ideology is that held by 
those who stress the human relations aspect. For them, the strategic action 
should concentrate on the components of the informal organization.^ Though 
they may not always appear explicitly in documents, pertaining to the reforms, 
the values of the change agent reflect themselves in a definitive manner on 
the strategy, and make up its normative or ideological component» 
The substantive component refers to the actual content of the strategy, 
such as present«! in the reform bills» Whether the measures contained in 
the change proposal have been drawn from experience within the system which 
J5/ Those who subscribe to the "human relations" point of view go a bit 
too far when they argue that motivation foregoes organization. The 
philosophy of human relations has undergone profound revision in the 
United States (a fact that many Brazilian "importers" have not yet 
realized) aimed at correcting several of its disfunctions, among which 
could be noted: (1) tendency to subordinate the organizational objectives 
to group interests; (2) encouragement of self-defense on the part of 
managers by transferring to the group (in the name of "democratic 
leaderships") responsibilities which should not be delegated; (3) the 
fallacy of complete compatibility between individual needs and 
organizational rationality and, what is perhaps worst of all, (4) the 
discredit resulting from the lack of differentiation between 
charlatanism and science» 
/is the 
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is the object of change, or from experience with other systems; whether the 
analysis of obstacles to the reforms considers only cognitive hindrances 
(such as lack of data, information, knowledge, know-how) or Aether it also 
takes into account value limitations (such as resistance to commitments in 
the way of schedules and dates, personalis^, biases* mistrust); whether the 
reform is a wholistic or gradualistic one, on a long, medium or short term 
basis - are differences in content which affect the strategy and must, 
therefore, be considered when assessing such strategy. 
The operational or behavioural component refers to the kinds of action 
taken by the change agents in the reform process. This component becomes 
visible only when a strategy is put into motion, but its characteristics can 
be identified early from the planning stage of the reform. Whether 
communications flow on a two-way basis between the reform group and the other 
agents of the bureaucracy, or only downward from the former to the latter; 
whether the reforming action only aims at the formal aspects of the system or 
involve the informal ones; whether the reform leadership tends to insulate 
so that that the ''clique11 of the reform becomes, even more distant from the 
leaders of the bureaucracy or on the contrary* tends to coopt so as to 
gradually absorb important strata of the bureaucracy - such are significant 
operational differences which cannot be disregarded in the evaluation of any 
change strategy. 
Observe that these three components of any model of change strategy 
- value, content and action - are not in reality distinct from one another. 
Their separation is defensible only in the abstract, for purposes of 
theoretical analysis. Actually, the significance of the three components 
for the characterization of a model of change strategy is likely to be 
unevenly distributed. The normative or ideological component precedes 
and conditions the other two. More precisely, the value system of the 
change agents bears decisively on their perception of what is to be done 
(substantive component, content) and how it is to be done (operative 




is not triable. Thus the importance of concentrating the analysis of the 
change strategy on the value or ideological component, comparing it with 
the typical behavioural characteristics of the system object of change« 
The Brazilian Administrative Reforms and, 
their strategic model 
An analysis of administrative reform experience in the federal area 
leads us to infer that the strategies whereby reforms have been attempted 
do not differ significantly from one another. Ih some sense, there have not 
been individual strategies, but a specific prevailing strategic pattern 
throughout the reform experience. This is suggested by some impressive 
regularities which are common not only to reforms in distinct areas such 
as personnel and budget, but also in a single area such as that of position 
classification. Should those diagnoses be correct (which we shall try to 
demonstrate in this article) the theoretical and pragmatic relevance of 
identifying and defining the characteristics of such a prevailing strategic 
pattern could not be ignored, for only after that identification and 
definition would it be possible to assess the strategic adequacy or 
inadequacy of the reforms, in the light of the prevailing behavioural 
traits of the Brazilian Bureaucracy. 
Based on the fundamental components of any strategy model - value, 
content and action - discussed above, it is possible to abstract in a 
theoretical model the change strategy that has prevailed in Brazilian 
reform attempts. The strategic model of Brazilian administrative reforms 
can be shaped as follows: 
Operational component: action 
Focus of action: formal elements 
Style of influence: compliance 
Power dynamics: insulative 
Substantive component: content 
Scope of change: wholistic and immediate 
Diagnostic 





Ideological component: value 
Strategy and behavioural prerequisites 
Strategy and process orientation 
In the following pages each of those components will be analyzed 
in the light of the Brazilian experience, iri an effort to render the model 
empirically valid. 
The operative componentt action 
Of the various elements of the operational or. behavioural component, 
three warrant special mention: the focus of strategic action, the process 
of influence used by the change agents and the type of power dynamics 
between the change agents and the leadership of the client system. 
Focus of action: formal elements : 
The action of reform has been focused almost always upon the formal 
structure of the system. In matériel administration, for example, the 
majority of the reform efforts (after a spell of significant contributions) 
has limited itself to "chart organization". Thus, in 1938 the Division of 
Matériel of the DASP absorbed the duties of the Permanent Commission on 
Standards, which was abolished.-^ In 1940 the Central Purchasing Commission 7/ 
was replaced by the Federal Purchasing Department In 1941 > the testing 
laboratories which belonged to the former Central Purchasing Commission 
were transferred to the National Institute of Technology.^ Two years 
later, in 1943* the laboratories were withdrawn from that institute and 9/ 
transferred to the Federal Purchasing Department.-'' Also in 1943* the 
Council of Matériel Administration was created with the purpose of promoting 
better co-ordination among, and greater efficiency of the agencies involved 
with the administration of matériel in the federal service.^' Finally, 
6/ Decree-Law 579* Colejao de Leis do Brasil (abridged hereafter as Coll.) 
July 30, 1938. . 
2/ Decree-Law 2206. Coll.. May 20. 1940̂  
B/ Decree-Law 1184, Coll., April 1, 1941» 
2/ Decree-Law 5984, Coll.. November 10, 1943» 




in 1945, the Division of Matériel of the DASP as well as the Council of 
Matériel Administration were subordinated to the Federal Purchasing 
Department«^/ In all this structural and functional reshuffling, one 
is able to ascertain from the description of the responsibilities of 
every new or transferred agency that, ultimately, as far as strategic 
orientation is concerned, these replacements did not represent any change 
at all. They amounted to a mere substitution of labels in order to 
heighten or lower the organizational status of the agencies. The formal 
attributions of the matériel system did not change significantly. In some 
cases the efforts to improve the system of matériel were concentrated on 
questions such as how to achieve a better co-ordination by subordinating 
agency X to agency Y, or by transferring given responsibilities from one 
agency to another. The prescriptive language of the reforms was typically 
couched thus: 
"Without harm to their attributions, the National Institute of 
Technology of the Ministry of Labour, Industry, and Commerce and 
the testing laboratories of the federal administration shall 
12/ 
co-operate wxth the agencies of matériel..."—7 
Such instructions were rarely translated into common procedures, since the 
compliance power of the formal organization had always been insufficient, 
especially after the overthrow of the dictatorial régime, to obtain the 
„ desired goals. 
In the area of position classification, the strategic action of the 
reforms was also focused upon the formal structure. Of all the attempts 
to classify civil service positions, the first of which dates back to 190?, 
11/ Decree-Law 8823-A, Coll., December 7, 1945. 
12/ Decree-Law 11101, Coll., Art. 12, December 11, 1942. 
13/ The history of the attempts at implementing a system of position 
classification in the federal civil service is presented in detail 
by the author in Classificagâo de Cargos no Brasil,.op. cit. 
/only two 
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only two proposals ever achieved legislative approval; the Law of 
Readjustment -which was enacted in 1936 and represented the first legislative 
breakthrough in position classification, and Law 3780, of July 12, I960, 
which established the present system. In this area, frustration has been 
greater than in others. Whereas some significant gains had been achieved 
with the Law of Readjustment, they were nevertheless lost along the years 
for lack of continuity in efforts to revise and bring up to date the 
classification plan. As regards the present plan, the consequences have 
been more disastrous than beneficial for federal administration. There is 
a total divorce between -what was intended to be done and what is actually 
being carried out. The criteria used for transferring positions from the 
old to the new system - a process which is known as enquadramento - are 
completely different from those used in drawing up the plan. No attention 
whatsoever was given to training.as a means of adjusting the man to the 
job. Here, again, the focus of action of the reform was confined to 
formal elements, such as adequacy of class specifications; complete 
distinction between a position and its eventual occupant; and well-defined 
lines of promotion across and within classes of position; and so on. 
In the area of organization and methods, in which the schemes 
generally known, as "administrative reform" are classified, the reforming 
action is no different, its attention being focused on the purely formal 
aspects. The classical principles of span of control and homogeneity of 
functions have guided the elaboration of projects of administrative reforms, 
sines the first one in 1953 to the one known as the Amaral Perbcoto Refom® 
The rationale of these reforms is based on the assumption that greater 
efficiency can be obtained if the structural arrangements of the bureaucracy 
facilitate rather than hinder the administrative process. Thus, lines of 
authority and responsibility are redefined, agencies are. broken up or 
merged, so as to keep in line with the principle of homogeneity of functions, 
and the number of subordinates who report directly to a superior is. also 
reduced in keeping with the principle of span of control. Pertinent 
questions here would be: is the bottleneck at the Presidency a problem 
/predominantly behavioural 
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predominantly behavioural or structural? Is., administrative decentralization 
a problem of knowing how to delegate or of. willingness to delegate and of. 
willingness to accept delegated responsibilities? . How much of the rationality 
of formal reorganizations clashes with non-rational bahaviour? 
Style of influence: compliance 
The style of influence used to implement the reform has been based on 
a process of compliance rather than on a process of internalization.^'' The 
former is characterized as predominantly mandatory, where decisions are 
presented in final form, complete and finished, leaving little or no. 
flexibility for alternative actions in the light of unforeseen conditions« 
The latter is predominantly suggestive and exploratory, where solutions 
are presented as starting points which are gradually modified as the reform 
progresses, adapting themselves to the real conditions. The critical 
\ 
distinction between the two processes, however, is that only the process 
of internalization leads to a perceptive reorganization, by the individual, 
of the relation between the means used in the change and the designs 
proposed by it. This is so because the process of internalization involves 
the value aspects (attitudes, habits) which hinder any change, whereas the 
compliance process confines.itself to the cognitive aspects (lack of know-
how, lack of information). 
This distinction becomes critical when one compares the necessary 
conditions for ensuring continuity in the change process put forth by 
both processes. In the compliance process,, maintaining the change requires 
permanent control on the part of the refora agents, which is not the case 
when the systaa object of change has internalized the reform values. The 
14/ This distinction refers to two of three forms - compliance, 
identification and internalization - of social influence as expounded 
by Herbert C. Kelman in "Process of Opinion Change" a The Public 




15/ federal experience of administrative reform clearly reveals the 
constant need - and, for long periods, the exercise of - permanent control 
of the changes wrought, so as to ensure their continuity. This applies all 
the more so to the reforms effected during periods of exception. It should 
not be forgotten that no sooner were the controlling powers of the change 
agents reduced with the return of democracy to the country, than the reform 
efforts suffered a set back which- continues even today. The majority of 
the achievements obtained through a compliance process of influence entered 
a phase of progressive weakening» This was due to the fact that the process 
was not able to internalize in the system object of change the values which 
would maintain and give continuity to the reform. The distinction between 
the compliance process and that of internalization is thus useful for under-
standing why.and how the movement of administrative reform in Brazil obtained 
its greatest achievements under dictatorial régime and suffered its greatest 
defeats after the return to democracy. 
The present, political situation revives the. importance of this point, 
since the public administrator has again compliance power at his disposal 
as an instrument of change strategy» There are numerous instances of this 
power which are best highlighted in recent income tax reforms and in the 
prominence of the Office of the Ministry of Planning. In both cases 
exceptional tools are available to enforce the reform measures. However, 
indispensable as it might be even for the survival of the régime to resort 
to compliance power, it is imperative that today's reform rid itself as 
much as possible of the seeds of tomorrow's counter-reform» Hence the 
great dilemma of today's Brazilian public administrator: that of disposing 
of a process of influence which should be needed to the very indispensable 
15/ . The reader will have noticed that, as used in this article, the term 
"administrative reform" is not limited to the structural reforms 
which have been attanpted since 1953« On the contrary, the expression 
has an all-encompassing sense, including any considerable attempt 
to make changes in public administration and especially those changes 
that depend on legislative approval since they alter basic criteria 
of operation, rights and authority relations» 
/minimum so 
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minimum so as not to endanger today's achievements» Thus the paradox of 
the rationality of a strong régime: to minimize the use of the compliance 
process and to maximize the internalization process, so as to nullify, 
beforehand, any revenges that might destroy indiscriminately both the 
positive achievements of the reforms as well as those which experience 
proved to be less fortunate. Thus the infinitely greater complexity of 
the responsibility of the nev/ President, whose task is no longer that of a 
relatively simple strategy of revolution but rather of a strategy of 
devolution - devolution not to groups or individuals who came before him, 
but devolution of responsibilities to ever wider circles of the leadership 
of the public service, a devolution that will expand the reforming power 
through growth and qualification of the reform group, a devolution that 
will draw upon the reform values (and not upon its agents) as basic 
instruments for assuring continuity of the proposed changes. The social 
and financial cost of the counter-reform which undermined the Daspjan work 
is priceless. Though there were inadequate aspects to this work, the 
counter-reform made no attempt to distinguish between the functional and 
disfunctional aspects, but aimed at all indistinctly. This is what should 
be avoided by abolishing, as far as possible, the easiest process - compliance -
in favour of the process of internalization. 
Power Dynamics: insulative 
As regards the power dynamics between the change agents ̂ ^ and the 
leaderships of the system object of reform, the strategy has been-characterized 
16/ The expressions "change agents", "reform agents" amd "reform group" 
are used interchangeably throughout this article, and refer to the 





by its insulative, rather than cooptative, style J 1 ^ In other words, the 
reform group does not grow in number as the reform develops itself, but 
rather isolates itself from the other agents of the system» Thus, instead . 
of converting gradually to the reform process layers ever more numerous of 
the leadership of the public service, the reform group acts as though it were 
concerned in defending "its own" reform« As a result, it fosters indifference, 
when not antagonism, on the part of the heads and advisors at all levels» 
The strategy has ignored who really runs the bureaucracy (the present 
leaders) and who can run it (the potential leaders)» This explains most 
failures in attempting to implement what seems crystal-clear on paper. 
The insulative style of the power dynamics between the agents of 
change and the leaders of the system becomes all the more crucial when not 
only the number» but the very composition of the reform group does not change 
significantly throughout the history of the reforms. This tends to hinder 
the work of these agents in such a way as to cause objections to, and 
misinterpretations of their proposals, for the simple reason that such 
proposals come from them, regardless of the degree of rationality such 
proposals might contain. This fact becomes all the more crucial because often 
these very agents are the best qualified in terms of experience and professional 
training to guide reforms of the public service. Their loss of face before 
the leaders of the gystem could and should be overcome by adopting different 
strategies. 
17/ The term cooptation refers to the process of assuring or expanding 
acceptance of a particular group, idea, or organization through 
incorporation (cooptation), to the structure of command of the change 
agents, of individuals notably known for their influence (whatever 
the basis of their influence) into the systan object of change. This 
strategy purposively used in the Tennessee Valley Authority experience 
is superbly theorized by Philip Selznick in "TVA and the Grass Roots -
A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organization". Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1949. 
18/ Such a growth needs not necessarily be formal, by official appointment 
of new elements to the reform group, but informal (and no less effective 
for this), by a more active participation of these elements since the 
planning stage of the reform. 
/The substantive 
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The substantive component: content 
Amongst the elements of this component two stand out:- change scope, 
understood here as a combination of the scope or inclusiveness and temporal 
perspective of the reform; and the diagnostic orientations which guide the 
obstacle mapping, that is, the biases of the reform group in the evaluation 
of the change barriers. These two elements condition significantly the 
content of a reform strategy. 
Scope of change: wholistic-immediatist 
As regards its scope or inclusiveness,, a reform may be partial (in 
varying degrees of partiality) or wholistic. As regards its temporal 
perspective, the reform will be immediate, on a medium- or long-term basis. 
The strategy of reform in Brazil has been wholistic-immediatist, in the 
sense of trying to do "everything at one time»« It is a tendency which 
has come right from its roots. Thus, in 1931, the Provisional Government 
centralized the purchasing activities under the newly created Central 
Purchasing Commission "..»with the responsibility for buying and distributing 
all goods necessary to the public services, besides promoting market surveys, 
examining the nature, quality, and resistance of materials to be bought, 
and solving problems related to the simplification, standardization, 
specification, technical testing, and control of the conservation and 
consumption of materiel"Thus, instead of adopting a gradualistic 
approach, thereby progressively assuming the responsibilities of purchasing 
for the entire federal service, the Commission adopted a wholistic approach 
by extending its jurisdiction to all supplies and equipment and to all 
ministries at once. There is little doubt that, as far as change strategy 
is concerned, this wholistic approach jeopardized the reform process, as 
observed by a scholar of the Brazilian experience: "In spite of the lack 
of restraints on the Central Purchasing Commission, it soon became evident 
19/ Gama e Silva, Jo%> Saldanha da, and Passarinho Pereira, Daisy Florie, 
"0 Sistema de Orgao Auxiliares e de Staff da Administrajao Brasileira", 
Seminario Internacional sdbre Qrganizacao, Direcao e Funcionamento de 
Servicos Auxiliares e Orgdos de Estado-Maior (STAFF), Serie C, Tema 1 





that the organization was incapable of performing all of its responsibilities 
because of workload; speed of processing purchases then became the criterion 
of action. Prices were made without price surveys; within a short time 
vendors became aware of this deficiency, and. a return to the pre-1930 
pricing practices resulted. These practices added to the lack of 
understanding of the idea of central purchasing already prevalent, and 
20/ 
Considerable antagonism was generated toward the Gomission,"—-
The same tendency can be observed in the field of position 
classification. Approved in I960, the Classification Law established a 
period of two years for its complete implementation* This process, however, 
is far fron finished. The temporal perspective irrealistically short has. 
resulted in successive extensions of deadlines, with profound consequences 
to.the idea of position classification based on the actual duties and 
responsibilities, of the positions. 
The most deplorable sympton of the plan's wholistic-immediate change 
scope, however, was that it encompassed not only so-called direct 
administration (ministries ard some departments) but was equally extended 
to all autarchies, including railroads and ports under federal control, 
almost doubling the number of positions to be transplanted to the new 
21 / 
system,— Lacking as it were a sufficient number of qualified personnel 
to tackle the problem of direct administration, DASP was at a complete 
loss when it attempted to classify positions in so-called indirect 
administration. Having lost control over enforcement of the criteria on 
which the enquadramento should be based, it was beyond this central 
agency's power to avoid the ensuing chaos, discontent and total discredit 
for the idea of position classification. At worst, the plan has been 
interpreted so that it gives legal sanction to old personal privileges and 
opens the way to new ones, such as the transference of function to achieve 
special enquadramento s. 
2Q/ Siegel, Gilbert B,, "The Vicissitudes of Governmental Reform in 
Brazil, A study of the DASP" (Dissertation presented to the University 
of Pittsburg for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 1964), pp. 62-63. 





The struggle for a merit system followed the same strategy as in 
other areas. Though prescribing merit as a basis for entrance for the 
whole federal service, the Federal Constitution of 1934 failed to attribute 
the responsibility for implementing that principle to any existing or new 
agency. Thus, as late as 1936 no steps had yet been taken to fulfill the 
letter of the Constitution which continued to be as good as mute. Again, 
a whoiistlc - and immediate orientation prevailed in 1936, when the Federal 
22/ 
Civil Service Council centralized examinations for all career positions.-— 
Because of its collegiate form and the lack of an appropriate staff, the 
Council was only able to carry out twelve examinations, three in 1937 and 2 "V 
nine in 1938, the year of its extinction.-*̂  In spite of the administrative 
limitations of the bureaucracy in undertaking such a frontal attack on the 
vices inherited from the past, change agents still insisted on a wholistic 
approach. The Federal Constitution of 1937 prescribed the morit system, 
through public examination, as the only form of entrance to all the 
existing positions in the public service. The Selection and Training 
Division of DASP was given, in 1938, jurisdiction over all the positions 
of the Executive Branch of the Federal government throughout the country, 
and all the subsequent laws have explicitly prescribed the merit system 
as the only form of éntrance to all career positions.^^ 
These first attenpts at introducing the merit system on a full scale 
and within the shortest possible time are good illustrations of what 
Hirschman has termed "the mot i vat ion-out runs-unde rst an ding style of 
22/ Wahrlich, Beatriz M.S., Administracao de Feragggtl - Principios e 
Té cnicas (Rio de Janeiro: Fundagao Getulio Vargas, 1964), P® 24. 
Ministro Extraordinario para a Reforma Administrativa, "Normas para 
Preservado e Revigoramento do Sistema d¿ Mérito", Rio de Janeiro, 
July 1963, p. 4 (mimeographed). 
2hj Decree-Law 1713, Coll., October 10, 1939, Art. 13, nee. VII, and 
Art, 17 (b); Decree-Law 1909, Coll., December 26, 1939; Federal 
Constitution of 1946, Art. 186; Law 1584, Coll., March 27, 1952, 
which extended the merit system to all autarchies; Law 1711, Coll., 
October 28, 1952, Art, 18; Law 3780, Coll., July 12, I960, 
Arts. 53 and 55, which centralized in the DASP the execution of 
examinations for all autarchies, thereby doubling responsibilities 
of the Division of Seléction and Training of DASP: and Law 3807, 




problem-solving", which is characterized by endlessly repeated calls far a 
full, integrated, definitive and rapid solution of the difficulties that 
are encountered.-^ Evidence of the wholistic approach of the strategy of 
the reforms through the merit system can be best illustrated by the statement 
of a recent reform group: 
"From all this one concludes that it is clear, even emphatic, that 
federal legislation determines the practice cf public competitive examinations 
for all the positions encompassed by the classification plans of both 
direct actoinistration and the autarchies» Furthermore, such legislation 
also centralizes in DASP the authority and r-esponsibility for carrying out 
all such examinations, and, consequently.»for the preparation of the lists 
of candidates who are eligible for appointment. „. 
The foregoing discussion of the wholism (globalism) which has 
characterized the change strategy of the merit system reforms may seem 
exaggerated. Moreover, some mi,*ht argue: After all, is it not, only natural 
for public administrative reforms to tend towards the wholistic? If we 
take as a basis the North American experience ~ which inspired the 
experience of administrative reform in Br-azil - our answer is no. Much 
to the contrary, the American experience is an example of gradualism. As 
registered by one of the best historians of the United States Civil service, 
Paul Van Riper: 
"The act itself (Pendleton Act) placed only slightly over 10 per 
cent of the positions in the federal public service - mainly clerical 
positions in Washington and in post offices and custom houses employing 
fifty or more persons - under the merit system to form the classified 
civil service..,"^/ 
25/ Hirschman, Albert 0., Journèys Towards Progress (New York: The 
Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., 1963), p. 235. 
26/ Ministro Extraordinàrio para a Reforma AdministratiVa, "Normas 
para a Preservagâo é Revigor amento do Sistema de Merito"5 op»cit63 
p. 8, italian added. 
21/ Van Riper, Paul,„History of the United States Civil Service 
(Evanston, HI,; Row, Peterson & Co., 1958), p. 105. 
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The gradualism of the American reform was not conceived by the 
legislature. Rather, it was an essential part of the philosophy of change 
of the American reformers. Their perceptions of political and administrative 
reality is worthy of note. In his testimony before the Senate Select 
Committees to examine the various branches of the Civil Service on . 
January 13, 1881, Dorman B. Eaton, the main promoter of the reforms, 
expressed his views in regard to the comprehensiveness of the Pendltton Act: 
"Another observation I want to make is that I think no law should 
be passed which would require the application of this system of examinations 
to the whole civil service of the government at once, or even to all that 
part to which it is legitimately applicable, as I have defined it. It would 
be too large altogether,.. We have got to create the machinery, ...In 
bringing new men together and entering for the first time upon a new system, 
you would be utterly over slaughtered and broken down if you were to be 
required to carry it all at once."^ 
Clearly, Eaton's understanding of t he problem did not outrun his great 
motivation to see the full and definite meritization of the American Civil 
service. Thanks to this - and the lesson is still valid today for so many . 
of the developing countries - the expansion of the merit system was gradual, 
but steady, as can be seen from table 1:--^ 
In the Organization and Methods area, the wholistic and immediatist 
approach of the Brazilian reform strategy prevailing right from the 
beginning with the creation of the old Efficiency Commissions which, 
encompassing activities both of organization and of personnel, were 
practically unable to do much in the Organization and Methods area. Even 
after the creation of DASP, the new efficiency commissions insisted on the 
error, being unable once again to make any contributions in the Organization 
and Methods area. Two early Daspian reformers justify such a failure thus: 
28/ U.S., Congress, Senate, Report 872. pp. 19-20, footnote 3, as quoted 
in Van Riper, op.cit.r p. 105, footnote 15.. 
23/ This chart is a condensation, by the author, of data released by the 
United States Civil Service Commission, as presented by Glen O.-Stahl 
in his Public Personnel Administration (New York: Harper & Row, 



















1304 . 131 203 13 V'ÜO 10.50 
1900 208 000 94 893 45.62 
1914 435 000 292 460 67.23 
1930 580 494 462 083 79.60 
1 014 117 726 827 71.67 
1950 1 934 040 1 6.',1 876 84.89 
1955 2 371 405 1 991 506 83.98 
I960 2 398 705 2 050 939 85.50 
"The reason (for the failures) is that the commissions were overtaken 
by the excessive workload regarding personnel problems, such as! 
preparation of promotion proposals, inspection' of admission processes, 
and reintegration and Improvement of extrànumeraries.' Besides, the 
practice was established of submitting to the commissions other 
matters entirely alien to their purposes, whenever such matters I 
involved some complexity. 
Finally, even after DASP had eventually managed to confine the 
efficiency committees to Organization and Methods activities, the work 
plan organized by it was clearly wholistic, since it included all activities 
pertaining to means administration? personnel (from the standpoint of 
efficiency), materiel (equipment and instàlations), financial resources, 
organization, work methods, and relationships among agencies and between 31/ 
them and the public»41- In short, the strategy òf administrative reforms 
has, one way or another, been characterized by a wholistic approach. 
JOt Gama e Silva, José Saldanha da, and Passarinho Pereira* Daisy Floris, 
op.cit.. p. 47. 
31/ A Dlvisao de Organizagào de Coordenasao e guas Abividades em 1942. 




Diagnostic Orientation: cognitivism 
Though less visible than the firsts this element of the substantive 
component of the strategy can also be inferred from the content of the 
reform projects. Obstacle mapping is a psychological process which occurs, 
with a greater or lesser degree of explicitness, in any attempt at change. 
In any strategic concept of a reform, the change agent makes certain 
assumptions as to the barriers raised against the changes intended,, Such 
assumptions vary, however, from one agent to another, according to his 
perception of what are the fundamental obstacles to be overcome. 
Two distinct diagnostic orientations can be identified in the 
obstacle-mapping process of a reform: cognitive orientation and normative 
orientation. In the first case, the diagnosis of the change agent would 
concentrate on factors such as lack of data, shortage of technical skills, 
inadequacies of legislation and the laying down of rules, absense of norms 
and instructions, etc. In the second case, the diagnosis would focus on 
problems such as lack of initiative, lack of interest, "gocd-guy-type" 
behaviour, self—defence, resistance to commitments of dates and deadlines, 
self-indulgence, personalis^, arid so forth, The distinction between a 
cognitive and normative orientation can be best understood with the help of 
the following example, where the first two diagnoses reveal!, a cognitive 
orientation whereas the last two indicate a normative orientation: 
As a rule, the cause of bottlenecks and inefficiency in organizations 
are due to: 
(1) inadequate legislation, outdated rules, in short, the structure 
of the organization. It is almost impossible to operate in a 
maze of requirements and unnecessary controls which only serve 
to multiply and complicate the work routinej 
(2) 
the shortage of personnel with technical and professional skills 
(with exceptions, of course) to carry out with efficiency the 
tasks they have been assigned; 
(3) 
the general lethargy, lack of initiative, fear of responsibility 
(with exceptions, of course); 
(4) subordination of the needs and objec s of the o ganization 
to e personal interests of the employees as a typical solution 
for the conflict between the individual and the organization. 
/Both these 
(J 
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Both these diagnostic orientations, therefore, bear significantly on 
the strategy adopted because the very ^election of the obstacles to be 
overcome leads the reforming action to concentrate on one or the other type 
of barrier.In the Brazilian reform experience the cognitive orientation 
has prevailed. Its greatest contention is based on the assumption that the 
system does not change because it does not know what and how to change. It 
is beyond the scope of this article to present a;content analysis of 
documents and projects of reform that would show the cognitive nature of 
Brazilian reform strategy. However, an examination of official documents, 
reports and articles concerning the reforms clearly shows that the diagnostic 
orientations of the change, agents emphasized the cognitive impediments, 
overlooking the normative obstacles. Pertinent questions here would be» 
does the system actually not change because it does not know how to change 
(cognitive) or because it does not want to change (normative)? Are the 
reasons due in particular to the absence of appropriate knowledge (cognitive) 
or appropriate behaviour (normative)? Which of these two.limitations have 
greater obstructive potential, greater hindering power? 
The importance of the change agent's diagnostic orientation is crucial 
due to its influence not only upon other elements of the strategy but also 
upon the dynamics of the obstacles to the reform. In other words, particular 
diagnostic orientations raise, or at least strengthen, certain strategic 
patterns; moreover, certain diagnostic orientations, ignoring particular 
obstacles, may unleash and activate these very same obstacles. The struggle 
for the merit system in the federal civil service is a good example of this 
point. Having defined the merit system as "one in which entrance to the 
civil service depends upon the candidate's competence as tested in competitive 
examinations" the underestimate of normative resistances stimulated particular 
patterns of change strategy. The focus of action, for example, confined 
itself to the "gateway" to the public service, i,e., the selection process 
and the competitive examinations became an end in themselves. Worse than 
the emphasis on the mere formal aspects of many of the competitive examinations 
was the fact that the concentration of human and financial resources on the 
task of selection was obtained at the sacrifice of other phases.of personnel 
administration, such as training. Considering the specific conditions of 
the Brazilian educational system, training would have been of much greater 




relevance as regards the professionallzation of the public service. Other 
elements of the strategy were directly affected by the cognitive orientation. 
The scope of change, for example, would not have been wholistic; had the 
change agents assessed realistically particular normative impediments» 
Due to the lack of human and material resources to implement the reform, 
the irrealistic wholism of the. strategy was responsible, among other things, 
for a total frustration and discredit of the merit system, A merit system 
which is only partial in its application, but conmands respect, is better 
than an all-embracing one but discredited. 
Finally (still as regards an underestimation of normative impediments), 
from the standpoint of latent or manifest obstacles, a strategy1 centered on 
selection unleashed violent reaction in a political context where clientelism 
prevail. Whereas the reform attempted openLy to abolish the spoils system 
in the public service, many politicians reacted against DASP and, after 1945, 
"took advantage of their chance" and practically emasculated the reform 
agency. Such obstacles would have continued latent> or at least would have 
lost much of their impact if the focus of strategic action (redefined in the 
light of a normative diagnostic orientation, rather than cognitive) had 
centered on training rather than on selection.^' If the definition of the 
32/ One should not infer from this an approval of certain so-called 
sociological interpretations which enhance the political functions of 
the bureaucracy and condemn the "technic!sm" of the reformers who try 
to bar the spoils system from the public service. Such an interpretation 
has some validity in developed contexts, where the technical criteria of 
the merit system, which, apply even to the highest, echelons, drastically 
reduce the flexibility of the system. The least controversial examples 
of such a case are to be seen in the British civil service and in the 
American civil service at the time of President-Eisenhower. Under such 
conditions, the Executive may feel politically stiffled in its task of 
governing; thus certain measures taken by Eisenhower in this area. 
However, the idea has been applied to under-developed contexts based 
on another rationales that since the private sector is unable to create a 
sufficient number of jobs so as to absorb even a small fraction (in terms 
of economical and social stability) of the active population, the public 
sector must, both as a matter of social responsibility and political 
survival of the regime itself, absorb this quota of unemployed regardless 
of their professional qualifications.In the Case of Brazil this contention 
is, to say the least, irresponsible and dangerous, in the first place, 
because it is not based on objective data about the impact of 
industrialization upon the Brazilian economy; and therefore ascribes to 
the public sector - through misinformation - a responsibility which no 
longer makes the same sense as 20 years ago,; In the second place, because 
by ignoring the very important distinction between patronage (so evident 
in the style of Vargas) and spoils (so evident in the style of Goulart) it 
offers a basis for strengthening the spoils system. 
/ TTM»r»$ +. mrotorn 
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merit system had not been literally copied from, the American experience 
(and from the initial phase of that experience, around 1883) but had 
undergone what could be called "sociological reduction",^- or still better, 
a process of "sociological imagination",^' the focus of the reform would 
have been on training rather than on selection. As such, the merit system 
would be defined as that in which "the civil servant is provided with the 
necessary training to perform adequately his functions so that his holding 
of a position be based upon his merit in performing its tasks1.1. Who would 
consider the first definition more valid than this one? Who would dare to 
defend a single definition of the merit system? Who would disagree with 
the fact that one of the crucial tasks of the administrator in the under-
developed context is a re-definition, re-ordering and often a repudiation 
of instruments, definitions, methods and techniques derived from hegemonic 
societies? 
The ideological component: value 
The normative or ideological component of reforms is the most 
important of all for, as stressed before, it.precedes the other components 
and bears its influence upon them. In an analysis of administrative ideology 
upon which both the formulation as well as the execution of the reforms have 
been based, two propositions deserve special attention: first, that the 
prevailing strategy in the Brazilian reform experience has been based on 
behavioural prerequisites and, second, that the strategy presumes a 
conditioning of the ends to the means - a process orientation. 
Strategy and behavioural prerequisites 
The concept of "prerequisites" is fundamental in the study of 
planned change, in any area subject to scientific intervention, from 
Psychology to Cultural Anthropology. Is the change possible only if certain 
prerequisites are attained, or should the change strategy be conceived in 
33/ See Guerreiro Ramos, A Reducao Sociologica (Rio de Janeiro, Edijoes • 
Tempo Brasileiro Ltda., 2nd edition, reviewed, 1965) pp. 81-84» 
34/ See Mills, Wright, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Grove Press, 




such a way as to disregard the prerequisites? regards the study of 
economical development $ this question is closely related with the strategies 
of an integrated, harmonic development, as opposed to strategies which see 
development as a chain of disequilibria. It is surprising that the studies 
of administrative development have not made use, as yet, of the concept 
of prerequisites to explain the change philosophy which underlie many 
reform strategies, mainly those of the developing world. In the case of 
the Brazilian federal experience, the reform strategy seems to require a 
prevalence, in the bureaucracy, of rational behaviour which elosely 
35/ 
resembles Max Weber's model of bureaucratic rationalityAmong the 
examples of Weberian rationality one could mention impartiality in dealing 
with administrative matters; political, philosophical and religious neutrality, 
as the basis of the decision-making process; impersonalxzation, instead of 
personalization, in carrying out the public function; the use of "office-
time" for organizational objectives, instead of personal objectives, etc. 
Thus, in so far as the measures depend on the prevalence of such behaviours, 
and in so far as they represent exceptions and not the rule in the behavioural 
orientations of the bureaucracy, the strategy finds no echo in the behavioural 
patterns of the public servants. Observe that the fact that the strategy 
is based on behavioural prerequisites is not enough to render it voids 
the voidness is characterized by the lack of such prerequisites in ths 
bureaucracy and - worst still - by the lack of measures designed to develop 
in the civ.ll servant behavioural patterns on which the success to the 
reforms would depend. 
Some examples may better clarify the relations between change strategy 
and behavioural prerequisites. In budgeting, the establishment of a posteriori 
control in order to facilitate purchasing operations often gave place to 
many disfunctions for the bureaucracy. In order to utilize their resources 
fully and avoid the possibility of losing their budgetary allotments, most 
Weber's bureaucratic model can be studied in From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1958), Chapter VII. An excellent collection of works on Weberian 
bureaucratic theory can be found in Reader in Bureaucracy, edited by 
Robert K. Marton, Alisa P, Gray, Barbara Hockey and Hanan C. Selvin 




government agencies developed the practice of attesting to the receipt of 
supplies which had not been delivered. The excuse for such practices was 
that the systematic delays of the budget allotments resulted in a 
shrinkage of the trading year, since purchasing orders could never be 
dispatched before May. Thus, the oaly way to avoid an interruption of 
supplies to the public service was to purchase from the very beginning of 
the year. The use of an a posteriori control, as it was assumed, would be 
a mekns of eliminating this kind of abuse. This was not the case, however, 
for a great deal of corruption resulted from this manoeuvre. The efficacy 
of the a posteriori control depended> therefore, on a behavioural orientation 
which did not prevail in the public service. The measure was functional 
only in intention, since the disfunctional aspects of it prevailed 
throughout. 
The experience in position classification offers another example 
of the gap between the strategy and the behavioural patterns upon which 
it is dependant. Because DASP suffers from a shortage of specialists and 
is thu3 unable to analyze in loco the situation of every agency, it has 
to depend on data supplied by the personnel departments of the different 
government agencies in order to decide upon the enquadramento of the civil 
servants. Since, on the other hand, the enquadramento has almost always 
been carried out on the basis of the job.titles presented in an inventory 
roster made up .prior to the present position classification plan (and not 
on the basis of the duties and responsibilities actually, performed by 
the civil servant) it has given place to a manoeuver which could be 
called "the trick of labelling". This consists in re-labelling a class 
or job category in the former system so that its occupant might be 
classed in a much higher position. As DASP proceeds with the enquadramento 
based on lists supplied by the different departments, the manoeuver works 
out because DASP is overwhelmed with work and short of qualified personnel. 
Perhaps the most striking example is the episode of the Administration 




Port Doctors and Port Typists - an attempt to avoid the same treatment 
dispensed to corresponding classes in the civil service — an attempt 
was made to transform elevator-operators into "technicians in ascension". 
The "Jornal do Brasil"^^ commented at thé time? 
"CHAOS IN THE FORT AUTHORITY - the Minister of Transportation 
approved the re-classification plan of the personnel in the Rio de 
Janeiro Port Authority where, amongst other curiosities, the job of 
"port typist" was created and mere. elevator-operators were transformed 
into "technicians in ascension", equal in position to engineers in the 
civil service. 
Many other examples could be found in other areas of institutional 
administration. It will suffice, however, to conclude with the case 
of the extranumerârio (exbranumerârios were not subject to entrance 
examinations). Created as an attempt to give the Executive a greater 
flexibility in its task of administration, the number of extranumerârios 
increased incensantly, due to certain advantages such as greater 
functional mobility, so that by I960, they represented- about two thirds 
of the federal civil service. Here again, the functionality of the 
intention lost to the disfunctionality in its execution. The strategy 
was based on behavioural prerequisites not typical of the Brazilian 
bureaucracy. One notices, therefore, a tendency of the system to reject 
those aspects which are in conflict with its prevailing orientations 
(the functional aspects) and to absorb those compatible with such 
orientation (the disfunctional aspects). Thus, instead of actually 
changing the client system, the reforms have contributed a great 
deal to the stabilization of the status quo, by providing opportunities 
for the reinforcement of patterns that already prevail in the behavioural 
profile of the bureaucracy. 




Strategy and pro cess-orientaticn 
One of the notions of administrative theory that most influenced 
the reformers was Willoughby's distinction between functional (ends) 
and institutional (means) activities as far back as 1927^^ Several 
different trends are rooted in such a distinction. Two, however, 
are particularly relevant for a criticism of the strategy used in 
the Brazilian experience. The first argues that only by possessing 
efficient administrative means (personnel, matériel, etc.,) can a government 
accomplish its purposes. Therefore, the aspect to be concentrated upon, 
is the means, or the housekeeping activities, as Wllloughby called them, 
since they represent basic conditions for governmental efficiency. The 
second idea was that, since those activities are common to all governmental 
agencies, reasons of efficiency and of a technical and economic nature as 
well, dictate the centralization of those functions in a single specialized 
agency to report directly to the Chief Executive. 
Among the possible consequences that may have resulted from this 
stress on the housekeeping activities - conditioning the achievement of 
the ends to the efficiency of the means¿ which we call process-orientation -
was a disregard fcr the actual goals to be pursued by the bureaucracy. 
What happened in effect was the triumph of technique over purpose; in other 
words, a process-orientation prevailed over a teleological orientation. 
While it is impossible to establish, on the one hand, any casual relationship 
between such a process-crientation of the reforms, and on the other, the 
lack of goal-orientation that characterizes much of the behaviour of the 
Brazilian bureaucrat, one might venture the hypothesis that the process-
orientation of the reformers may have reinforced cultural patterns which 
tend to confer a higher place to instrumental, rather than terminal, values 
- thereby becoming an agent of the status quo, rather than of change. 
Observe, en passant, the relation between the notion of process-orientation 
and prerequisites. In this case, the means tend to be seen as prerequisites 
to the ends.. Finally, it is worth stressing that, besides concentrating 
on the means, the reformers chose such "inflexible" means as personnel, 
22/ Willoughby, W.F., "Principles of Public Administration" (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins Press, 1927). 
/matériel. etc. 
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matériel, etc., which, especially in an underdeveloped country, increase 
the cost of the reform and have less of a multiplying effect upon the 
dynamics of the civil service. If means were to have been the focus of 
concentration, it would have been more profitable to concentrate on the 
"elastic" means such as research, planning, and leadership. 
Among the possible consequences deriving from the second notion 
- centralization of the means - one could mention thé atrophy of some of 
these activities (such as those related to the conservation of public 
buildings), in benefit of others which DASP had to consider with priority; 
and the long struggle with the Ministry of Finance regarding the formulation 
of the budget proposal, of disrupting consequences for DASP. Had the . 
obstacle-napping taken into account not only the cognitive impediments, but 
also the normative ones, the reformers would have probably tried to streamline 
the budget process by adopting another strategy. After all, would it not 
have been more sensible to seek such a streamlining through the Ministry 
of Finance, instead of against it? How rational was it to provoke an obstacle 
that could have.been overcome for the good of the reform, just to "complete", 
with the budget, the centralization of the means? Which is the more 
important, the process or the goal? 
Critical synthesis: the triple inadequacy of the strategy 
A s siiming, then, that the normative or ideological component precedes 
and conditions all the others, criticism of the prevailing reform strategy 
in Brazilian federal experience must concentrate on the ideology of the 
reforms. Such an ideology is composed of several elements, two of which 
= the dependence on.the prevalence, in the bureaucracy, of particular 
behavioural patterns, and the process-orientation - were discussed when 
analyzing the Brazilian model of change strategy. As for the former of 
these elements, the strategy is triply inadequate. In the first place, it 
is so for depending on behavioural patterns which do not characterize the 
behavioural orientations of the Brazilian bureaucracy. These behavioural 
patterns resemble those of Max Weber's ideal bureaucrat: one characterized 
by a high degree of functional rationality. The notion of time as a scarce, 




axe indispensable attitudes for the implementation of work rationalization, 
routine simplification and purchasing schedules. These attitudes are 
behavioural prerequisites without which the formal elements of the reform 
- flow charts, time charts, PERT diagrams - produce no change effect.and 
are lost in an air of indifference or in an atmosphere of antagonism. On 
the other hand, to see time as a scarce commodity is not enough, since this 
can indicate an awareness of making the best use of the working hour either 
for the benefit of the organization or for one's own benefit. The case is 
very common for individuals who never have time and are always really 
very pressed for time, rushing around..,because they have four or five 
other activities outside the civil service which demand from them a maximum 
temporal orientation. The "subordination of,one's private interests to the 
general interests" (as pointed out by Fayol), impartiality in relation 
with subordinates (instead of preferences), neutrality as the basis of the 
decision-making process (instead of factiousness), the use of functiipnal 
authority for organizational (and not for personal) ends exclusively, are 
other examples of attitudes which together would make up what could be 
called the behavioural profile of the Vfeberian bureaucracy, which is far . 
away from the prevailing behavioural patterns in the Brazilian bureaucracy. 
An impirical characterization of the behavioural profile of the federal 
bureaucracy is a natter of urgent administrative research in Brazil. Though 
this profile is still virtually unexplored it seems reasonable to 
admit, considering the lack of more objective data, that the prevailing 
behavioural orientations in the civil service tend to be antagonistic to 
those which constitute the behavioural prerequisites of an instrumental 
strategy. Hence the inadequacy of this strategy as applied to the Brazilian 
reality. 
3,8/ Two aspects of the governmental profile of the Brazilian bureaucracy 
- authority orientations and temporal orientations - -were studied by 
the author and are discussed in his Ph.D. thesis, "Change Strategr 
and Client System: Administrative Reform in Brazil" (Graduate 
School, University of Southern California, 1966), Chapters V and VI. 
/In the 
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In the second place, the strategy is inadequate since it does not 
incorporate tactics, stimuli, or measures designed to intensify or generate 
behavioural patterns essential to the success of the reform» . 2h fact, the 
reform agents have almost completely ignored the problem of conceiving 
strategies that will foster the integration of civil servants in the change 
process. What has been done to sell the social value •? not only, the 
administrative, technical and rational value - of the reform measures? 
What has been done to reorganize the perceptions of the civil servants 
(and, in particular, of those who possess authority) in order that each 
might feel responsible for the reform; a reformer and not merely one who is 
reformed? What stimuli have been conceived to compensate for and foster. 
behavioural patterns compatible with the reform measures? Almost nothing» 
The assumption of the Brazilian reform strategies, though implicit,,is that 
in Administration, what is logical is necessarily psychological - a false 
assumption because it conceives the human being as strictly rational, 
forgetting the emotional aspects (illogical or non-logical) of his 
individuality. The fact of having action oriented to the formal elements, 
of using an authoritative model of influence and of being confined to 
cognitive obstacles, explains the strategy's failure of fostering and . . 
generating the behavioural patterns on which it depends. This explanation, 
however, only, reafirms this second inadequacy. 
Finally., an instrumental strategy is inadequate because, as regards the 
inadequacies analyzed above; it.results, after.all, in the disfunctionality 
of the reform goals» The discussion of this point makes two digressions 
necessary. The first concerns the distinction between the teleology and 
the strategy of the reforms,.or, in other vrords, between its set of objectives 
and its modus faciendi. It should be said that the ends of the reforms are, 
at least in principle, adequate, since they embody an effort aimed at greater 
rationality in the civil service, They attempt to substitute merit for 
napotism, equity for personalism, morality for corruption, economy for 





Thus, from the teleological standpoint, the reforms were not disfunctional. 
The second digression regards the potential dualism in every bureaucratic 
action, since such an action may be functional for a given reference and 
disfunctional for another.«^ This concept, of major value to modern 
administrative theory, arose from the works of Talcott Parsons, ̂  and its 
application to organizational theory is due to Robert Merton.^® Applying 
the concepts of functionality and disfunctionality to Max Weber» s . . 
bureaucratic model, llerton criticized the analytical bias of the model, 
showing that Weber limited himself to the study of the functional aspects 
of the bureaucratic form of organization, missing the disfunctional analysis 
of bureaucracy arising also from the same principles and methods responsible 
for administrative efficiency.^' For instance, a well-specified structure 
of authority may on one hand be a leverage for disciplined performance and 
adequate identification of responsibilities for the application of penalties. 
On the other, it can be a deterrent to upward communication, risk-taking, 
initiative and creativity. Military and religious organizations, in particular, 
tend to be faced with such problems. Merton's analysis is much in line with 
Gideon Sjoberg's concept of "contradictory functional requirements".^/ 
39/ Today, the concepts of "function" is one of the universals of science," 
In the social sciences, "functionalism" has become the central roferant, 
when not the lable, of many schools of thought; Anthropologists like 
Linton, Malinowski, Herkovits, Tadcliffe-Brown, and Ruth Benedict have * 
extensively discussed the functions of cultural patterns. In psychology, 
the functionalism of Angell, Dewey, and Carr represented a reaction 
against the introspectionism of Titchner. Economists, particularly 
after Keynes, has relied more and more on the concept of "function"; 
possibly, the most manifest indication of this tendency can be found 
in studies of econometrics. Finally, structural-functionalism became * 
a distinct sociological school of thought expounded by men like Parsons, 
Merton, Levy and Shills. The concept of "function" as applied to" 
bureaucratic theory is derived from this sociological perspective, 
40/ Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (rev.ed.; Glencoe, 111.: 
The Free Press of.Glencoe, 1954), p. 217. 
41/ Merton, Robert K,, "Manifest arid Latent Functions", in Social Theory 
and Social Structure, ed.-Robert'K. Merton (rev.ed.; Glencoe, 111,: 
The Free Press of.Glencoe, 1963), pp. 19-83. 
k2f Merton, Robert K., "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality" in Social 
Structure. op.cit., pp. 195-206 
43/ Sjoberg, Gideon, "Contradictory Functional Requirements and Social 
Systems", The Journal of Conflict Resolution. IV, N° 2 (June i960), 




According to this concept every system - and bureaucracy is a system -
presents inherent contradictory functional requirements which lead to the 
development of contradictory sub-structures. In complex organizations, 
the most clear example, of this precept is the classical distinction 
between formal and informal organization, the former resulting from a 
functional need (the need for general rules and instructions as a guarantee 
toward the operational unity of the organization) and the latter resulting, 
from another functional need (the sense of teamwork, of value integration). 
Another example still to be found in modern, organizations refers to the 
contradictions between the stimuli given toward the strict observance of. 
rules and regulations and, at the same time, to the spirit of iniciative, 
to the capacity of achieving objectives (even if this implies in acting 
against the rules and regulations). 
The following table devised by the author, is an application of the 
notions of contradictory functional requisites to some of Weber's ideal 
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Professional authority as the basis 
of decision 
(expertise) 
IjljJ Nascimento Kleber, Change Strategy 'and Client System: Administrative 
Reform in BrazilT op. cit.f p. 262, For further elaboration of this 
concept and its Implications for a theory of bureaucracy, see the essay 
"Functionality and Disfunctionality of Position-Orientedness in 




To sum up, administrative efficiency equally depends on bureaucratizing 
elements (needs listed.on the left) conducive to a certain measure of 
operational uniformity, as on debureaucr at izing, or at least "non-
bureaucratic", elements (needs listed on the right) in order to ensure the 
system a minimum capacity on self-adjustment and innovation. The conciliation 
of these antagonistic needs so as to minimize disfunctionalities and naximize 
functionalities is the major and inalienable task of the administrator. 
This compatibility greatly depends - much more than is generally thought -
on the pre-dispositions or prevailing behavioural tendencies of the 
administrative system. If the system is characterized by disfunctional 
behavioural orientation, i.e., anti-bureaucratic, the mere introduction of 
measures demanding a high degree of rational behavioural patterns will 
only result in disfunctions for the system. With this remark - of major 
importance to the strategy of any reform - we can close this theoretical 
digression and return to criticism of the Brazilian experience. 
The last of the three inadequacies of the strategy of Brazilian 
reforms is that the latter have resulted, in the end, in the disfunctionality 
of their objectives. This is so because, given the Brazilian bureaucracy's 
disfunctional behavioural orientations - orientations which the strategy 
has not attempted to correct - and furthermore, considering that every 
bureaucratic action (that is, every administrative reform) is potentially 
functional and disfunctional, the tendency of the civil service will be 
(and has been) to reject those aspects incongruent with their typical 
behavioural orientations and to absorb those which are compatible with such 
orientations» In other words, this results in a tendency to repel the 
functional aspects of the reforms and absorb their disfunctional aspects. 
Many examples of such dynamics were pointed out throughout this article. 
The doubling of the number of extranumerdrios over the number of career 
civil servant (called "funcionarios"), the labelling of classes such as 
technician-in-ascension, the practice of taking dishonest advantage of the 
a posteriori control, and many others - are crystal clear examples of the 
"disfunctionalization" of objectives which, in principle, were entirely 




its teleology to such an extent that the changes have resulted, in mary 
cases, in tools for strengthening the status quo (rather than for innovation) 
because, "in erasing the past", they have conferred rights, "legalized" odd 
situations and privileges, in the hope that "from here on it will be 
different". This is the most crucial inadequacy of the change strategy 
which has prevailed in the Brazilian experience of administrative reform: 
disfunctionalization the goals of the.reform, which strengthens the 
status quo and discredits the reforms. 
Elements for formulating a Brazilian model 
of administrative reform strategy 
The interpretation of the past provides a basis for devising strategic 
guidelines to enhance the implementation of future attempts at administrative 
reform. The analysis of the Brazilian experience may be summarized by 
identifying the three fundamental inadequacies of the strategy on which this 
interpretation of past failures of reform efforts is based: (1) the 
incompatibility between the behavioural requirements of the strategy and the 
behavioural reality of the bureaucracy; (2) the non-existence of measures 
aimed at inspiring or generating the behavioural patterns that the reform 
requires; and (3) the ultimate disfunctionalization of the teleology of the 
reforms, in that their functional aspects have" not found a response in the 
bureaucracy, whereas their negative ones have. 
The process of operationalizing reforms as a whole will result in 
increased possibilities of successful implementation if the strategy adopted 
bears in mind the practical conditions of the real situation in Brazilian 
bureaucracy. The formulation of a Brazilian model of reform strategy must 
consider the following guideliness: 
Graduallstic orientation. The past has shown that the demands imposed 
by a wholistic and immediatistic change scope are beyond the existing 
administrative capabilities of the bureaucracy. During dictatorial periods, 
the non-existence of legislative barriers has been an especially compelling 
inducement to global changes. However, even if entirely free to plan and 
proclaim a wholistic reform, the. bureaucracy is not prepared to meet the 
attendant administrative demands. The result of past reform attempts has been 
formalism, - the distance between planning and implementation of plans, 
/between law 
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between law and behaviour - with real losses for the idea of reform. As 
noted before, an all-encompassing but discredited merit system nay be worse 
than a limited but effective one. The main point is to keep the reform 
scope within realistic boundaries. i 
Selectivity. The constituent parts of any bureaucracy are unevenly 
change power. Some are highly stable, crystallized and virtually untouchable 
others are adaptive enough to dispense with any outside help to become more 
effective; and still others may be under varying degrees of potential 
disequilibrium and might easily internalize certain changes. .Past reforms 
in Brazil have not taken account of such differences. Rather, their 
wholistic orientation has promoted "across-the-board" undertakings, with 
a consequent misallocation of resources to areas which either (1) are 
irrelevant for the reform process, as a whole, at a given stage, or (2) are 
so resistent to change as to be "unproductive - investments" at a given 
moment. By adopting a selective orientation, change efforts would be 
concentrated on more change-prone areas, or those critical to public 
administration, no matter what their degree of adaptability. A recent 
example of this last case is to be seen in the gradual, selective and 
continued reform in federal taxation. 
Selectivity leads to a strategy whereby scarce bureaucratic resources 
are allocated opportunistically, based on the degree of changefulness or 
the urgency of the administrative area under reform. The basic assumption 
of this orientation is that once change is unleashed in a given part of 
the system, that.part becomes a source of change inputs for other parts. 
Continuity. The reform experience. of the past has been characterized 
by intermittency, rather than continuity, in change efforts. Reforms have 
usually been undertaken under conditions of crisis, when the disfunctions 
of the status quo have reached unbearable proportions. Much of their 
ineffectiveness lias resulted from this intermittency - everything is started 




There is a need for approaching change as a continuous, rather than 
intermittent or crucial, task. Continuity is directly related to gradualism. 
A gradualistic approach represents, in fact, a piece-meal change strategy. 
Its basic advantage is its political feasibility and administrative adequacy 
as related to the operational requirements of the bureaucracry. Its main 
weakness is the slower rate of change it impels. However, the latter point 
does not have to be necessarily so, as long as the reform process is 
continuous. 
Normative orientation. One of the most distinctive characteristics 
of the prevailing strategy of the Brazilian reform, experience is that a 
cognitive orientation, rather than a normative one, has guided the obstacle-
mapping process. Hence, even the training programmes related to the reforms 
have reflected the "machine-model" bias, entirely overlooking the behavioural 
aspects. It then becomes necessary to shift the focus of those training 
programmes so as to transform them into tools for internalizing the value 
aspects - attitudes, habits, opinions, moods - conducive to behavioural 
patterns necessary for implementing the reform. Only through a new approach 
to training, giving it a normative orientation (besides the cognitive one 
which has prevailed until now), will it be possible to strengthen and 
disseminate the behavioural patterns necessary to the reforms and discourage 
those which are antagonistic. 
Influence through internalization. Past experience has shown that 
whatever were the achievements of the reforms during dictatorial periods 
in Brazil, those achievements entered a progressive stage of dilution, as 
soon as the controlling power of the DASP was reduced by the political 
redemocratization of the country. This is so because influence processes 
based upon authority require permanent control by the change agent to assure 
respect for effected changes. Once control is removed, the system reverts in' 
large measure to.its previous state. Therefore, in a true sense, change 
has not occurred. The relative success of the reform movement during a 
dictatorship is explained by the exceptional power of control in the hands 
of the reform agents. The debacle of the reform is explained by the 
restrictions of this power, since the strategy used did not provide for the . 




In view of the current political situation in Brazil, the quest for 
internalization takes on a renewed importance for the reform process. In 
a way, there has been a return to the past, since the change agents can resort 
again to authoritative processes in order to effect change. The point, then, 
is how to reconcile the immediate need for authority (sometimes even to 
assure the survival of the régime) with the need for internalizing the 
values of the reforms, so as to assure the endurance of the achievements 
after the country's political situation returns to normal. From the 
standpoint of a strategy of reforms, this may constitute the most critical 
dilemma of the Brazilian bureaucracy of today. There are indications, for 
instance, that the reforms carried out in the Ministry of Finance have, 
achieved excellent results - tax revenues have increased substantially, 
effective control systems have made tax collection easier and safer for 
both the taxpayer and the public employees, and so on. These reforms have 
adopted a gradualistic change scope; they also have reflected a selectivistic 
orientation, not in the sense of concentrating on a more changeful area of 
the bureaucracy, but oh one where change was an imperative condition for the 
political stability of the régime. Nevertheless, there is no denying that the 
change agents have enjoyed authoritative powers which sooner or later will 
cease. The test of the strategic adequacy of the reform will occur when 
that power is removed. By simply recognizing the need for internalization, 
change agents will become more sensitive to the possibilities of increasing 
the endurance of today's achievements through instilling their corresponding 
values into the bureaucracy. 
Leadership through cooptation. The strategy of administrative reform 
should avoid any elitist orientation that would result in insulating the 
reform group from the structure of.leadership in the civil service. In 
the past, a handful of technicians, an administrative élite3 undertook the 
task of reform. Thus, even though a network of subunits in charge of the 
reforms was formally created - the ministerial departments, of administration -
and the personnel of such units belonged to the ministries, the necessary 
cooptation of the leadership did not occur. Therefore, the organization 




sense of having central and peripheral units sharing the same values, 
professional qualifications, and loyalty to the organization. : In other 
words, the change group never formed an integrated constellation, but 
remained a solitary star within the bureaucracy. From the perspective of 
change•strategy, this insulation of the reform leadership bears heavily 
upon the development of resistance against the intended changes and in the 
coalescence of such resistances into a "united front" against the reforming 
élite. A progressive expansion of the leadership in charge of the reform, 
through cooptation, would greatly increase thè possibilities of implementing 
such reform. 
The above guidelines are by no means specific or comprehensive enough 
to constitute a model of change strategy for administrative reform in Brazil. 
However, if compared to the prevailing strategic characteristics of Brazilian 
reforms, these guidelines represent a shift from a structural to a behavioural 
concept of change strategy. 
The Brazilian bureaucracy is crystallized and inflexible in several 
areas and non-formalized and hyperflexible in many others. Administrative 
reforms should perform a double, though apparently paradoxical task of 
debureaucratizing the former and bureaucratizing the latter - in the Ueberian 
sence. In both, the process and forms of change must embody a behaviourally*-
oriented strategy based upon the realities of the Brazilian bureaucracy. 


